1.10.3 Provisions for high consequence dangerous goods

NOTE: In addition to the security provisions of ADN, competent authorities may implement further security provisions for reasons other than safety during carriage (see also Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Agreement). In order not to impede international and multimodal carriage by different explosives security marks, it is recommended that such marks be formatted consistent with an internationally harmonized standard (e.g. European Union Commission Directive 2008/43/EC).

1.10.3.1 Definition of high consequence dangerous goods

1.10.3.1.1 High consequence dangerous goods are those which have the potential for misuse in a terrorist event and which may, as a result, produce serious consequences such as mass casualties, mass destruction or, particularly for Class 7, mass socio-economic disruption. 

1.10.3.1.2 High consequence dangerous goods in classes other than Class 7 are those listed in Table 1.10.3.1.2 and carried in quantities greater than those indicated therein.

1.10.3.1.3 to 1.10.3.1.5 apply to radioactive material

1.10.3.2 Security plans

1.10.3.2.1 Carriers, consignors and other participants specified in 1.4.2 and 1.4.3 engaged in the carriage of high consequence dangerous goods (see Table 1.10.3.1.2) or high consequence radioactive material (see 1.10.3.1.3) shall adopt, implement and comply with a security plan that addresses at least the elements specified in 1.10.3.2.2.

1.10.3.2.2 The security plan shall comprise at least the following elements:

(a) specific allocation of responsibilities for security to competent and qualified persons with appropriate authority to carry out their responsibilities;

(b) records of dangerous goods or types of dangerous goods concerned;

(c) review of current operations and assessment of security risks, including any stops necessary to the transport operation, the keeping of dangerous goods in the vessel, tank or container before, during and after the journey and the intermediate temporary storage of dangerous goods during the course of intermodal transfer or transshipment between units;

(d) clear statement of measures that are to be taken to reduce security risks, commensurate with the responsibilities and duties of the participant, including:
- training;
- security policies (e.g. response to higher threat conditions, new employee/employment verification, etc.);
- operating practices (e.g. choice/use of routes where known, access to dangerous goods in intermediate temporary storage (as defined in (c)), proximity to vulnerable infrastructure etc.);
- equipment and resources that are to be used to reduce risks;

(e) effective and up to date procedures for reporting and dealing with security threats, breaches of security or security incidents;

(f) procedures for the evaluation and testing of security plans and procedures for periodic review and update of the plans;

(g) measures to ensure the physical security of transport information contained in the security plan; and

(h) measures to ensure that the distribution of information relating to the transport operation contained in the security plan is limited to those who need to have it. Such measures shall not preclude the provision of information required elsewhere in ADN.

NOTE: Carriers, consignors and consignees should co-operate with each other and with competent authorities to exchange threat information, apply appropriate security measures and respond to security incidents.

1.10.3.3 Operational or technical measures shall be taken on vessels carrying high consequence dangerous goods (see Table 1.10.3.1.2) or high consequence radioactive material (see 1.10.3.1.3) in order to prevent the improper use of the vessel and of the dangerous goods.

The application of these protective measures shall not jeopardize emergency response.

NOTE: When appropriate and already fitted, the use of transport telemetry or other tracking methods or devices should be used to monitor the movement of high consequence dangerous goods (see Table 1.10.3.1.2 or 1.10.3.1.3).